Presentations (§ scheduled): International Economic Association World Congress 2023§, University at Albany - State University of New York 2022, Colorado University Environmental & Resource Economics Workshop 2022, Midwest International Trade Conference 2022, American Economic Association 2022 (Poster), Southern Economic Association 2021, Western Economic Association Annual 2021, Midwest Economic Association 2021, Western Economic Association International 2021, Heartland Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop at Illinois 2019, UIUC Graduate Seminars
Abstract: We study network effects in the diffusion of regulatory standards through international trade. Our results show that countries are more likely to domestically adopt regulations that they comply with while exporting. We find evidence of such diffusion primarily in regulations concerning attributes of the final product rather than production processes. Consistent with a network effect, we show that countries more open to international trade are the drivers of regulatory diffusion. In an analysis of diffusion in individual features within labelling regulations---the most prevalent regulations in our data---we find that labelling requirements ensuring safety of use propagate the most, and countries tend to domestically adopt features similar to those imposed by their importing partners. Overall, our results support the argument that economic integration can facilitate the strengthening of regulatory standards.
Presentations († by co-author): Midwest Economic Association 2021†, North American Regional Science Council 2020†, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association 2019, UIUC Graduate Seminars
Trade Clubs and International Environmental Agreements: The Basel Convention (with George Deltas)
[Draft available upon request]
Abstract: The Basel Convention for trade in hazardous waste regulates waste trade between members and also imposes stringent restrictions on trade between members and non-members. We investigate the importance of these exclusionary trade restrictions in encouraging countries to join. We find that accession to the treaty indeed reduces waste trade between members and non-members, and provides incentives to join the Convention once membership becomes sufficiently high. Using both reduced form and model-based analysis, we show that this trade effect is quantitatively important in causing countries with a low intrinsic willingness to join to become members. Our findings have implications for the efficacy of trade clubs in counteracting free-rider effects in the formation of international environmental agreements.
Presentations (§ scheduled, † by co-author): Western Illinois University§, Heartland Workshop on Environmental and Resource Economics at Illinois 2023†, University of Vermont†, The Political Economics of Environmental Sustainability Conference, Stanford University, 2023, Canadian Resource and Environmental Economics Association Annual Conference 2023, CRETE 2023†, Conference on Auctions, Competition, Regulation, and Public Policy, Lancaster University, 2023†, AERE@SEA 2022†