Prakrati Thakur

I am an economist specializing in international trade and environmental economics. My current research is on international trade in waste with a focus on its cross-country welfare consequences, the design of an international environmental agreement on waste trade, and the effects of waste trade de-liberalization on firms and cities. I also study how the pattern of international trade encourages countries to adopt non-tariff barriers as well as how non-tariff barriers influence environmental outcomes.

I currently serve as an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and hold a PhD in Economics from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

thakup@rpi.edu | Curriculum Vitae | Google Scholar

Working Papers

Global Waste Trade: Comparative Advantage, the Pollution Haven Effect, and Externality Costs

Revise and Resubmit, Economic Inquiry

Abstract: I quantify how comparative advantage and the pollution haven effect (PHE) shape international waste flows and infer the associated externality costs by constructing a Ricardian model with generation, trade, and use as a production input of waste. Combining waste flow, tariff, and environmental regulation data with a meteorological pollution dispersion instrument, I estimate that a 1% increase in trade costs reduces various waste flows by 7–29.3%. Stricter environmental regulation in origin relative to the destination lowers trade costs for certain waste by 7-77.7%. Per-unit externality costs increase but gains from waste trade decrease with income, with PHE contributing substantially.

Trade Clubs and International Environmental Agreements: The Effects of the Basel Convention (with George Deltas)

Abstract: The Basel Convention for the trade of hazardous waste regulates the waste trade between members and also imposes stringent restrictions on the trade between members and non-members. We investigate the importance of these exclusionary trade restrictions in impacting bilateral trade flows and their spatial redistribution across Basel members and non-members. We find that accession to the treaty indeed reduces waste trade between the acceding country and non-members to a much greater extent than it impacts trade between that country and other members. As a result, the Convention's trade club feature provides incentives to join the Convention once membership becomes sufficiently high. The trade club feature also serves as an important accelerator of the Basel Convention's impact on global waste trade: the total impact on global waste flows when membership reaches 50 percent in the mid 1990's is almost as high as when membership becomes nearly complete at the end of the 2010's. This is because when membership is 50 percent, the number of trade pairs that are subject to the large member to non-member trade frictions is maximal. Finally, we find substantial heterogeneity in effects of the Basel Convention and of its trade club feature for OECD and non-OECD countries. Our findings have implications for the efficacy of trade clubs in mitigating environmental externalities and in counteracting free-rider effects in the formation of international environmental agreements.

Work in Progress

Quantifying the Spatial Impacts of a Green Industrial Policy: Evidence from China's Waste Import Ban (with Cihang Wang)

Adapting to Foreign Standards: Technical Barriers to Trade and the Geography of US Emissions (with Sergio Rocha)

Trade Clubs and Entry into International Environmental Agreements (with George Deltas)

Publications

Global Impact of a Unilateral Waste Trade Regulation

[Online Appendix] [Published Version]

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2026, Pages 195-228.

China banned imports of several waste categories beginning in 2017. Exploiting variation between banned waste materials and exempt regular materials, I combine a difference-in-differences approach with the gravity model of trade to estimate its impact on global waste flows. My results show that the ban led to an overall decline in international waste flows, primarily through the reduction in imports by China. While some of the low-value waste materials like plastics were diverted to other lower-income countries, overall trade in high-value waste like metals declined. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that low-income countries saved 1.3-3.8 billion USD in external costs by 2020, roughly 14-32% of the savings by China. My results indicate that a unilateral regulation can meaningfully lower environmental costs beyond the regulation-imposing country.

Economic Integration and Diffusion of Regulatory Standards: Evidence from Trade Networks (with Sergio Rocha)

[Online Appendix]

Canadian Journal of Economics, Accepted

Abstract: We document network effects in the diffusion of regulatory standards through international trade. Using both an instrumental variables approach, based on the time-varying geographic component of trade, and a recentering approach, exploiting the timing of regulation adoption, we provide robust evidence that countries tend to domestically adopt the regulations of their key trade partners, especially when imposed by their export destinations. Leveraging the high dimensionality of our data, we show that the diffusion process is stronger for regulations and products with observable compliance. Our findings imply that economic integration can strengthen regulatory standards, aiding international policy coordination.

Subsumed Paper

Economic Impact of International Waste Flows

Abstract: I quantify the economic impact of international trade in waste. I build a structural gravity model in which waste is a byproduct of manufacturing and an input to recycling while waste flows are governed by both comparative advantage and the pollution haven effect. Although existing patterns of waste trade make countries of all income levels better off, low-value waste trade makes middle-income countries worse off. China’s 2018 ban on low-value waste imports made China and several lower-income countries better off. The economic loss in lower-income countries due to low-value waste trade is attributed to the pollution haven effect.